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Abstract
This article investigates social and spatial changes in the Athens metropolitan area between 1991 and 2011. The main
question is whether social polarisation—and the contraction of intermediate occupational categories—unevenly devel-
oped across the city is related to the changing of segregation patterns during the examined period. We established that
theworking-classmoved towards themiddle and themiddle-classmoved towards the top, but the relative position of both
parts did not change in the overall socio-spatial hierarchy. The broad types of socio-spatial change in Athens (driven by pro-
fessionalisation, proletarianisation or polarisation) were eventually related to different spatial imprints in the city’s social
geography. Broad trends identified in other cities, like the centralisation of higher occupations and the peripheralisation
of poverty, were not at all present here. In Athens, changes between 1991 and 2011 can be summarised by (1) the relative
stability and upward social movement of the traditional working-class and their surrounding areas, accounting for almost
half of the city, (2) the expansion of traditional bourgeois strongholds to neighbouring formerly socially mixed areas—25%
of the city—and their conversion tomore homogeneousmiddle-class neighbourhoods through professionalisation, (3) the
proletarianisation of 10% of the city following a course of perpetual decline in parts of the central municipality and (4) the
polarisation and increased social mix of the traditional bourgeois strongholds related to the considerable inflow of poor
migrants working for upper-middle-class households.
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1. Introduction
Deindustrialisation and globalisation have produced
changes in the social structure of large metropolitan
areas in advanced capitalist societies. There were two
opposite approaches in the early 1970s claiming, on the
one hand, the growth of the upper pole of the social
hierarchy—professionalisation (Bell, 1973)—and, on the
other, the growth of the lower pole—proletarianisation
(Braverman, 1974). In the 1980s and early 1990s, a third
approach—polarisation—was developed by Friedmann
and Wolff (1982), Friedmann (1986) and Sassen (1991),
defending that both poles of the social hierarchy were
growing at the expense of intermediate positions. The
‘polarisation thesis’ focused on world or global cities,
i.e., on the metropolitan areas that had substantially
increased their role in themanagement of the globalising
economy by providing a network of high-end producer
services to transnational corporations.
Hamnett (2020) provides an overview of the dis-
cussions about these approaches with a focus on the
polarisation thesis. He also provides empirical evidence
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to support or disprove these three theses for several
large cities across the world over the last 50 years.
He concludes that in most cases there is professional-
isation combined sometimes with polarisation, which,
however, does not appear as an unavoidable universal
effect of globalisation. Polarisation appears to be an out-
come related to contextual factors like welfare regimes,
varieties of capitalism, urbanisation paths, immigra-
tion flows and their regulatory policies. This conclusion
matches his previous claims about the polarisation the-
sis (Hamnett, 1994, 1996).
Hamnett’s discussion about social polarisation usu-
ally evaluates its validity in terms of changes in the occu-
pational or broader social structure and deals much less
with its spatial dimension (Buttler & Hamnett, 2012).
Sassen (1991), however, claimed that social polarisa-
tion in global cities leads to more segregation due
to the gentrification of centrally located working-class
spaces by the incoming and growing corporate elite and
the appropriation of prime spaces by corporate activ-
ities. The dividing spatial impact of globalisation on
world cities has been discussed by several authors (e.g.,
Marcuse & van Kempen, 2000; Mollenkopf & Castells,
1992). Recently, van Ham, Uesugi, Tammaru, Manley,
and Janssen (2020) have revisited the cities discussed by
Sassen (New York, London and Tokyo) and, apart from
eventually agreeing with Hamnett’s claim about profes-
sionalisation, deal with the changing levels and patterns
of segregation observed between 1980 and 2010. Their
analysis shows that although the levels of segregation
have not changed much over these 30 years, the social
geography of these cities was considerably reshaped.
In New York and London, the main trends were the
growing concentration of higher-income occupations in
central locations through gentrification and the periph-
eralisation of poverty. In Tokyo, changes were less mani-
fest, involving mainly the intrusion of higher-income cat-
egories in some neighbourhoods of the disadvantaged
eastern part of the city.
The main purpose of this article is to discuss the spa-
tial imprint of social changes in Athens between 1991
and 2011, taking polarisation as the reference process.
Our primary hypothesis is that residential areas where
polar occupational categories increased their weight dur-
ing these 20 years have moved towards the top or
the bottom of the city’s hierarchy of residential spaces,
while those where intermediate categories increased
moved towards the middle. This hypothesis is accom-
panied by the assumption that polarisation is a pro-
cess strongly diversified in space, as exemplified by the
comparative analysis of five East European capital cities
where polarised areas were very unequally distributed
both within and among cities (Marcińczak et al., 2015).
The analysis of changes within different types of residen-
tial spaces in Athens is used to illustrate this diversity and
to discuss the causality of observed changes related to
parameters beyond those which induce social polarisa-
tion. Sorando (2021, in this issue) used a similar method-
ology to investigate the trajectories of different social
spaces in Madrid in this issue.
2. Persistent Questions about Social Polarisation and
Methodological Issues
Since the 1970s, empirical data have corroborated pro-
fessionalisation much more than proletarianisation in
the advanced capitalist world. Managers and profes-
sionals were expanding categories while the working
class was shrinking. However, relying on the simple
growth or decrease in these categories should not be
enough. Braverman’s (1974) position was not that the
working class was growing stricto sensu, but that many
other occupational categories—mainly in the services—
were moving towards the occupational bottom through
increased deskilling, precariousness and low wages.
Today’s proletarians are not the same as those of indus-
trial societies. Many jobs at the lower end of services
do not require skills, are poorly paid, provide minimal
job security and those who perform these jobs are eas-
ily replaced. These jobs are regulated as labour contracts
rather than service relationships which are reserved for
those occupying secure positions in the labour market
(Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992). Women of working-class
origin and immigrants are mainly providing the human
capital to expand proletarian positions in today’s occupa-
tional structures. Considering only the traditional work-
ing class to assess the lower part of the social hierarchy
is, therefore, negating that positions in social hierarchies
are relative and that the shrinking of the working class is
mainly indicating that the changing economy introduces
new, deletes old and alters the content and the place-
ment order of all occupational positions.
Professionalisation is not unambiguous either.
Managers and professionals may be expanding, but their
relative social position is not the same as that of the
1970s. These occupations are now much less homoge-
neous. On the one hand, a substantial fragment—e.g.,
professors and researchers, professionals and managers
in the public sector, self-employed professionals without
employees—is no longer part of the higher occupational
positions in terms of income or job security. The lim-
its between higher and intermediate occupational posi-
tions are increasingly placed within rather than beyond
managers and professionals. Moreover, a large part of
the expanding categories of managers and professionals
in advanced capitalist societies are the ones that have
experienced the lowest income increase compared to
other parts of the social hierarchy in recent decades—
mainly the supermanagers characterised by higher earn-
ings, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon context since the
end of the 1980s (Piketty, 2013, pp. 500–505) and the
‘enablers’ who are very highly remunerated for facilitat-
ing the exclusive consumption needs of the super-rich in
top-tier global cities (Atkinson, 2020)—as well as to the
expanding and upwards moving middle-classes of China
and India (Milanovic, 2016).
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These reservations about rejecting proletarianisa-
tion and accepting professionalisation at face value
also affect how polarisation should be investigated.
The upper pole should not comprise all managers and
professionals, but only those partaking in the corporate
elite of the global economy and, secondly, the high-rank
officers of the public administration and the local large
employers. This limitation would be more compatible
with themechanismbehind the growth of the upper pole
proposed by Sassen (1991), leading to the attraction of a
corporate elite operating the network of vital production
services for transnational corporations in global cities.
Likewise, the lower pole should comprise the workforce
attracted by such cities to service personal needs and to
perform the menial jobs within the workplaces of the
corporate elite. Both poles should, therefore, comprise
a large share of migrants, either as highly qualified pro-
fessionals and managers attracted by competitive job
offers or as poor migrants willing to perform routine
jobs for low wages to escape from worse conditions in
their places of origin. The combination with the loss of
intermediate positions in the occupational hierarchy—
due to the declining industry—depicts the hypothetical
landscape of polarisation in global cities. Three ques-
tions arise:
The first is practical. The limits of the upper and
lower poles of the occupational hierarchy according
to the previous paragraph are very difficult to iden-
tify within occupational datasets originating from cen-
suses or standard surveys. In very few cases, mainly in
France, occupational data can allowmore detailed inves-
tigations (e.g., Préteceille, 2018). In most cases, how-
ever, analyses—including, e.g., Maloutas (2007)—are
restricted by the available data sets and the upper (man-
agers and professionals) and lower categories (working-
class occupations) are used as broad proxies, often with-
out acknowledging their limitations. Moreover, there is
no clear distinction between segments of the occupa-
tional hierarchy that are affected by globalisation and
those that are not. In most cases, occupational positions
are neither completely affected nor completely unaf-
fected by globalisation and, consequently, the limits of
the poles that should be investigated become evenmore
blurred. Several solutions can be considered, like the
combination of occupational and income groups under-
taken by van Ham et al. (2020), but precision remains a
challenge, even more so when a comparison among dif-
ferent contexts is involved.
The second question is more fundamental. Should
we limit our investigation to the part of the social
structure mostly affected by globalisation or should we
expand our focus? In cities at the top, like New York
City, the two options may not be very different, but as
we get closer to ‘ordinary’ cities (Robinson, 2006), the
part not clearly affected by globalisation becomes more
and more sizeable. Athens is ranked as a ‘beta’ global
city for 2020 (GaWC, 2020), meaning that changes in its
social and spatial structures should be expected to be
less affected by global forces than those in cities at the
top of the list.
The third question is methodological. When we talk
about professionalisation or polarisation, we assume
that their limits are rather clear and that they are mutu-
ally exclusive. In reality, however, this may not be the
case: 30% growth of the upper pole and a 5% decline
of the lower one may be a clear case of professionali-
sation, and a 20% growth of both poles may be a clear
case of polarisation. But a 30% growth of the upper pole
and a 10% growth of the lower one is both profession-
alisation (dominant trend) and polarisation (both poles
are growing).Moreover, professionalisation and proletar-
ianisation can materialise within conditions of growing
or shrinking intermediate social categories. We assume
that a growing or shrinking social middle is also chang-
ing the content of professionalisation or proletarianisa-
tion. In this article, our attention is mainly turned to
the parts of the city where intermediate categories are
shrinking andwhere changes in polar categories—in prin-
ciple more closely related to global forces—are more
clearly reshaping the city’s social profile. This induced
us to initially divide our terrain into areas with a grow-
ing or shrinking social middle and then to subdivide
the latter according to the main trend of social change
(e.g., professionalisation).
3. Social Polarisation in Athens?
Athens is a Mediterranean metropolis in the Southeast
of Europe with comparatively reduced connections to
regional and global economic networks. This is partly
due to the difficult relations for over a century with
Turkey, Greece’s major neighbour, and to the shutting of
all the country’s other land borders from the Cold War
to the 1990s. The expansive Greek corporate activities
since the 1990s in banking and telecommunications with
takeovers in neighbouring Balkan countries, in Turkey
and Cyprus, was short-lived and literally disappeared in
the early 2010s with the sovereign debt crisis. Moreover,
the Greek economy never invested in highly innovative
industrial activities or in high-end producer services that
would be attractive for global markets. Greek exports
comprised a large share of unprocessed agricultural prod-
ucts, while industry and services weremainly oriented to
the national market. Tourism and merchant marine have
been the most extroverted activities, but the manage-
ment of the former could be located in tourist areas out-
side Athens and shipping companies have usually settled
their headquarters outside Greece, usually in London.
As a result, the appeal of Athens for members of the
corporate elite has been weak. However, the data on
changes in broad occupational categories between 1991
and 2011 show an impressive increase in the percentage
of higher occupational categories and a decrease of blue-
collar workers. Table 1 shows that Athens experienced
professionalisation, with the sum of the two polar occu-
pational groups climbing from 55.1% to 65.4% between
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Table 1. Share of managers and professionals and blue-collar workers in the active population and distribution by nation-
ality group in the Athens metropolitan area (1991–2011).
Managers & professionals Blue-collar workers
1991 2011 1991 2011
% in active population 23.7 37.7 31.4 27.7
% by nationality group
Greeks 97.2 96.6 97.4 69.2
Developed economy countries 2.1 1.3 0.7 1.3
Developing countries 0.7 2.1 1.9 29.4
Total 100 100 100 100
% within nationality groups
Greeks 23.6 41.8 31.1 22.1
Developed economy countries 43.4 43.1 19.8 30.8
Developing countries 12.9 6.5 44.3 68.7
Note: This table and all subsequent calculations refer to the 25–54 age group of the economically active population living in the Athens
metropolitan area. The exclusion of older age groups is induced by our focus on the economically active and on those who are more
residentially mobile and, therefore, more partaking in the reshaping of segregation patterns. In 1991, 97.2% of the managers and pro-
fessionals were Greek and 23.6% of the Greeks were managers or professionals at that period. Table 1 overestimates managers and
professionals since technicians and professionals’ assistants are also included because they could not be separated from professionals
in 1991.Without technicians and professionals’ assistants, the percentage of managers and professionals in 2011 would be 26%. Source:
EKKE-ELSTAT (2015).
1991 and 2011, mainly due to the increase in managers
and professionals.
The sharp increase of managers and profession-
als between 1991 and 2011 mainly comprises profes-
sionals rather than managers (242,000 new profession-
als’ positions against 48,000 for managers). Moreover,
50.4% of managers and 23.1% of professionals were
self-employed in 2011 (EKKE-ELSTAT, 2015)—therefore
not part of the salaried corporate elite—while a large
part of salaried professionals was employed in the pub-
lic sector. Also, the attraction of a foreign highly qual-
ified workforce has been very small: 2,000 new posi-
tions for nationals from developed economy countries
and 9,000 fromdeveloping ones between 1991 and 2011
(EKKE-ELSTAT, 2015), while Greek nationals continued to
represent about 97% of this higher occupational cate-
gory (Table 1). The occupational structure of Athens is
therefore professionalised, but not like in global cities
at the top of the list. Only the native Greek component
in the labour market was professionalised, and the posi-
tions filled usually did not belong to the corporate elite.
On the other hand, the composition of the lower
pole of blue-collar workers changed significantly despite
their aggregate share in the active population remaining
quite stable relative to the dramatic increase in the share
of the upper pole between 1991 and 2011. Migrants
from developing countries formed about 30% of this cat-
egory in 2011, rising from a mere 2% in 1991. Only 22%
of Greeks were blue-collar workers in 2011, compared
to 69% of migrants from developing countries (Table 1).
In this case, globalisation has affected the occupational
structure of Athens through the collapse of socialist
regimes in the Balkans, and mainly in Albania, which pro-
vided more than 50% of immigrants in Greece in the
1990s and the 2000s. Once again, it was not the func-
tion of Athens as a nexus or as a hub that attracted new
migrants but push factors in their places of origin with
accompanying effects at the receiving end. It is also the
case with the recent migrant crisis in 2015, though at a
smaller scale.
These changes in the occupational structure are not
contradicted by the rather stable level of income inequal-
ities in Greece, and presumably in Athens. The s80/s20
index (i.e., the ratio of the upper to the lower quin-
tile of the income distribution) has oscillated around 6
between 1995 and 2011—6.1 in 1995 and 6.4 in 2011—
according to Katsikas, Karakitsios, Filinis, and Petralias
(2015), based on microdata of the Hellenic Statistical
Authority (ELSTAT) on poverty.
Another important change between 1991 and 2011
is the gender ratio in different occupations. The partic-
ipation of women in the labour market has constantly
increased, but not in the same way for different occupa-
tional categories. The share of women increased in the
upper pole (from 41.7% in 1991 to 51% in 2011) mainly
among professionals, but much less in the higher manag-
ing positions. It also increased among blue-collar work-
ers (from 15.3% in 1991 to 26.1% in 2011), especially at
the lower end of unskilled positions (EKKE-ELSTAT, 2015).
In both categories, the participation of women increased
mainly at the bottom. At the top, it is mainly young,
socially mobile native Greek women from intermediate
social categories whose trajectories are often curtailed
by glass ceilings. At the bottom, even younger women,
mostly migrants from developing countries, have been
relegated to routine jobs despite frequently possessing
much higher qualifications which are not acknowledged
by the city’s labour market. Migrant women accounted
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for 1.2% of professionals and 0.3% of blue-collar workers
in 1991. These percentages changed to 1.5% and 28.9%
respectively in 2011 (EKKE-ELSTAT, 2015). Feminisation
has, therefore, mitigated professionalisation in the sense
that the latter has not been developed on the model of
growth of the corporate elite; the feminisation of the
lower pole, on the other hand, is closer to the global
city model as it mostly refers to the growing share of the
femalemigrant workforce employed in personal services
for upper-middle-class households.
4. The spatial Patterns of Changes in the Occupational
Structure
4.1. Data and Method
All data used in the subsequent analysis are part of the
micro datasets of the 1991 and 2011 censuses concern-
ing the metropolitan area of Athens. They have been
accessed through the “Panorama of Greeks Census data
1991–2011” application (EKKE-ELSTAT, 2015). Our analy-
sis uses polarisation as a starting point in the broad
sense of initially dividing the city’s residential areas into
polarised and depolarised areas (i.e., where the social
middle is shrinking or growing respectively). Then, we
focus mainly on the part of the city where intermediate
categories are shrinking and explore the different types
of trends, i.e., professionalisation, proletarianisation or
polarisation. Themeasureswe used to distinguish the dif-
ferent types of spaces are simple. They are based on the
average percentage change of occupational categories
in the metropolitan area, and the difference—in terms
of standard deviation from average—of this percentage
change in the small neighbourhoods of the city (ad hoc
aggregates of ELSTAT’s 3,000 URANUs [Urban Analysis
Units] that provided 455 units with an average popula-
tion between 3,000 and 4,000 inhabitants).
4.2. Results and Discussion
We have examined the changes of the spatial imprint
of the three broad occupational categories (managers
and professionals; intermediate occupations; blue-collar
workers) during the 1991–2011 period, linking themwith
the social profile of residential areas. In fact, we have
divided the city’s residential space in accordance with
the changes in the mix of the three broad occupational
categories and explored thereafter whether the change
observed is related to the social composition and the
location of the areas it corresponded to. We start by
distinguishing between residential areas where the sum
of the two occupational poles increased or decreased
regardless of their positive or negative contribution.
This option allows distinguishing spaces that are mov-
ing towards the social middle from spaces that move
towards the edges (Figure 1).
We initially ordered neighbourhoods of the Athens
metropolitan area in three categories according to their
share of blue-collar workers: (1) the workers’ areas,
which correspond to 30% of inhabitants living in neigh-
bourhoods with the highest share of blue-collar workers,
(2) the higher occupation areas, which also comprise
30% of individuals living in the neighbourhoods with
the smallest share of blue-collar workers and (3) the
intermediate areas that correspond to the remaining
40% of the population. Table 2 shows that changes in
the occupational composition of residential areas are
related to their social profile. In fact, in the residential
spaces where the share of workers is the lowest (deciles
1, 2 and 3) the sum of the two poles increased by 17.6pp,
while the increase was very small (1.8pp) in the three
deciles with the highest share of workers. Moreover,
polarisation stricto sensu–i.e., when the shares of both
poles increase—is observed only in the first three deciles.




intermediate categories Professionalization PolarizationProletarianization
Final distribution
(period t + 1)































Figure 1.Major types of social change in terms of polarisation/depolarisation.
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Table 2. Percentage ofmanagers and professions (M&P) and blue-collar workers (BCW) in the active population aged 25–54
in the Athens metropolitan area, according to the percentage of blue-collar workers at the URANU level.
1991 2011
Area/Decile % M&P % BCW Sum %M&P % BCW Sum
Higher occupations areas/Deciles 1–3 36.4 16.2 52.6 50.7 19.5 70.2
Intermediates areas/Deciles 4–7 21.1 32.0 53.1 36.7 27.4 64.1
Workers areas/Deciles 8–10 12.3 48.9 61.2 27.7 35.3 63.0
All areas 23.7 31.4 54.8 37.7 27.7 65.3
Source: EKKE-ELSTAT (2015).
growth of the share of managers and professionals and a
sharp decrease in the proportion of workers, especially
in the deciles where workers had the highest shares.
It looks, therefore, as if there is professionalisation all
over the city—even if the distribution of this category
remains very unequally distributed among deciles—and
polarisation only in the most bourgeois neighbourhoods
of the city.
Table 2 shows that polarisation is observed at the
higher socio-spatial pole, where a big increase in higher
categories is combinedwith a slight increase in the lower
categories. In the other two groups of areas, there is a
trend towards more social mix, not due to the growth of
intermediate categories, but to the equilibration of the
two poles. These patterns may not make much sense at
this very broad level of analysis, but they invite the explo-
ration of causal mechanisms inmore spatial detail where
these mechanisms operate.
As noticed in previous work on segregation in Athens
(Maloutas, 2007;Maloutas, Arapoglou, Kandylis, & Sayas,
2012; Maloutas & Spyrellis, 2019), segregation levels did
not increase during the examined period. The index of
dissimilarity (ID) has decreased between 1991 and 2011,
from 24.1% to 21.5% formanagers and professionals and
from 26.7% to 20.2% for blue-collar workers. It would be
expected for managers and professionals who increased
in numbers and expanded in areas where their share
was small. It was less expected for blue-collar workers
because shrinking categories are usually also confined
in space.
The declining levels of segregation are not necessar-
ily related to reduced changes in the city’s social geogra-
phy. VanHamet al. (2020) show that stable or decreasing
IDs for London and New York for the period 1980–2010
developed in parallel with the concentration of higher
occupational groups in central areas andwith the periph-
eralisation of poverty. The social geography of Athens
has also changed substantially but has not followed a sim-
ilar path.
For a detailed examination of changes in the city’s
social geography, we initially distinguished between
spaces of growth or shrinkage of the social middle.
Figure 2 distinguishes spaceswhere the share of interme-
diate occupational categories has increased and those
where their share has decreased more than 1 standard
deviation below their average decrease between 1991
and 2011. Spaces with a lower decrease of intermediate
occupations are not marked with a symbol on this map.
Figure 2 shows that there is a clear dichotomy
between the eastern and the western part of Athens
according to changes in the share of intermediate cate-
gories. This dichotomy coincideswith the broad partition
of the city into working-class (West) and middle-class
areas (East). Figure 3 shows the forms of the different
types of the city’s residential space in terms of dominant
trends. In the West, intermediate categories increased
their share in most spaces, remained stable or mildly
decreased between 1991 and 2011, while in the East
their share decreased noticeably.
The growth or stability of intermediate categories in
theWest is due to the shrinking of the working-class and
the spatial entrapment of the endogenous social mobil-
ity in the traditional working-class strongholds of Athens
(Maloutas, 2004). The latter entails that the socially
mobile new generation of working-class children usually
does not abandon their parental neighbourhoods due to
the importance of family self-help networks in a context
of reduced availability of social services, a phenomenon
observed in other metropolises of Southern Europe as
well (Leal, 2004).
The areas with the highest growth of intermediate
categories are clearly situated in the western working-
class suburbs (Figure 3, type 1.a). These are the lowest-
rise areas—55% live in apartment blocks compared to
the average of 70% for the whole city—where the hous-
ing stock is relatively recent (EKKE-ELSTAT, 2015). They
are surrounded by a broader group of lower-middle-class
and working-class neighbourhoods (Figure 3, type 1.b),
which also comprise pockets in the eastern part of
the city and the outer periphery, where the trend in
1991–2011 was stability or mild decrease of interme-
diate categories. The upward social mobility trend in
these areas involvesmainly nativeGreekswith aworking-
class background who have accessed intermediate occu-
pational positions. An important part of this mobility
is female (Arapoglou & Sayas, 2009), related to the
much more important progress of women in education
and especially of young women of working-class ori-
gin. These women have been massively partaking to
the active population—compared to their mothers and
Social Inclusion, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 2, Pages 117–128 122
Municipality of
Athens
Growing intermediate social categories
Shrinking intermediate social categories
Figure 2. Residential spaces in Athensmetropolitan areawith a growing or shrinking share of intermediate social categories
between 1991 and 2011. Notes: Black triangles depict areas where the share of intermediate occupations decreased at
least by −17.5pp, i.e., 1 standard deviation (−7.8pp) more than their average decrease in 1991–2011 (−9.7pp); grey trian-
gles represent areas where the share of intermediate occupations increased; areas without symbols correspond to areas
with a mild decrease of intermediate occupations (up to −17.5pp). The size of the symbols is proportional to the resident
population aged 25–54.
grandmothers—and mainly accessed lower positions in
services since working-class jobs are still dominated by
males. However, this process of moving towards the
social middle is not to be taken at face value since the rel-
ative position of these residential spaces and of the occu-
pational categories that populate them remain at the
bottom of the city’s socio-spatial hierarchies. The type 1
of residential space hosts a very large part of the city’s
active population aged 25–54, 44% in 1991 and 48% in
2011. It had the highest share of working-class occupa-
tions in 1991 (Table 3) and lost a substantial part of
it in the next 20 years, while it gained important num-
bers of managers and professionals—in fact, their shares
doubled—becoming socially much more mixed. Type 1
has been less accessed than average by immigrants, but
it continues to lag in terms of housing surface per capita
and of the education level of its population (Table 3).
Themaps in Figure 3 should be further described and
explained as follows:
• Type 1: Areas of growth or stability of intermediate
categories (12.1%):
– Type 1.a: The share of Intermediate occupa-
tions increased (> 0pp)
– Type 1.b: Areas of stability or mild decrease
of intermediate categories (36%): The share
of intermediate occupations decreased
slightly [−10pp; 0pp]
• Type 2: Areas of professionalisation (25.6%):
– The share of intermediate occupations
decreased dramatically (< −10pp)
– The share of blue collar-workers decreased
(< 0pp)
– The share of managers and professionals
increased more than the average (> +15pp)
• Type 3: Areas of proletarianisation (9.3%):
– The share of intermediate occupations
decreased dramatically (< −10pp)
– Blue-collar workers compensate at least half
of the drop in the share of intermediate pro-
fessions in each neighbourhood
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Type 1 Type 2
Type 3 Type 4
Figure 3. Location patterns of residential areas according to changing social profile trends in Athens metropolitan area
(1991–2011). Notes: Spatial units represented on theses maps correspond to aggregates of URANUs of the metropolitan
area of Athens. Percentages in brackets represent the share of individuals aged 25–54 living in this type of area in 2011.
• Type 4: Areas of polarisation (5.9%):
– The share of intermediate occupations
decreased dramatically (< −10pp)
– Either the share of managers and profes-
sionals increased more than the average
(> +15pp) and the share of blue-collar work-
ers increased less than the average (< −6pp)
– Or the share of blue-collar workers
increased more than the average (> −6pp)
and the share of managers and profession-
als increased less than the average (< +15pp)
Type 2 neighbourhoods contain residential spaces,
where the increase in managers and professionals was
the driving force of change and the share of blue-
collar workers remained stable or decreased moderately
(Figure 3, Table 3). This type of spaces covers most of
the middle-class neighbourhoods of the city and about
25% of the active population aged 25–54. They have an
average share of residents in apartment blocks and their
housing stock is more recent than in all other types—
60% of housing built after 1980 compared to the average
of 50% for the whole city (EKKE-ELSTAT, 2015). They are
not the traditional bourgeois strongholds, but close to
them and along the main communication axes that link
them to the city centre. These spaces, rapidly appropri-
ated by higher occupational groups, are not at all located
in the city centre, contrary to the outcome of gentrifi-
cation processes observed in other cities, especially in
theAnglophoneworld. They complement the settlement
pattern of the middle-classes in the north-eastern sub-
urbs, the south—where they filled spaces along the axes
leading from the centre to the coastal communities—
as well as isolated spaces within the western—working-
class—part of the city and in the distant periphery.
A small part of these areas is located at the periph-
ery of the central municipality, without any particular
link with gentrification processes. The dominant change
pattern for type 2 spaces is the embourgeoisement of
the surrounding areas of upper-middle-class strongholds.
They are spaces of expansion for middle-class cate-
gories, where the shares of managers and professionals
(slightly less than 30%) and blue-collar workers (around
25%) were quite close in 1991. The distance between
these shares increased significantly by 2011 (around
50% of managers and professionals and less than 20%
of blue-collar workers). The percentage of immigrants
remained below the average at the level of themetropoli-
tan area, while housing conditions and the education
level of the active population remained above the city’s
average (Table 3).
The following types of neighbourhoods (type 3) com-
prise fewer people—about 10% of the active population
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Table 3. Selected characteristics of types 1–4 of residential areas in Athens metropolitan area in 1991 and 2011 (%).
Relative size Occupation Nationality Housing Education
% Active % 50sm, pp % Higher
population % M&P % BCW % Immigrants or more education
Types 1991 2011 1991 2011 1991 2011 1991 2011 1991 2011 1991 2011
1 43.8 48.1 15.3 30.3 43.8 32.4 0.8 10.6 3.3 10.8 7.8 16.5
1a 10.7 12.1 12 25.2 51.4 36.7 0.8 9.2 2.8 9.4 4.9 11.5
1b 33.1 36 16.3 32 41.4 30.9 0.8 11.1 3.5 11.3 8.8 18.2
2 24.5 25.6 28.6 48.5 24 18.8 0.9 7.3 6.6 19.5 19.9 34.8
3 11.5 9.3 31.6 31.9 19.5 37.6 3.7 37.5 10.8 18.1 22.5 25.6
4 6.4 5.9 40.4 58.7 11.8 14.8 2.4 8.7 17.1 35.6 32.4 47.8
All 23.7 37.7 31.4 27.7 1.3 12.8 6.4 15.8 15.5 25.1
Source: EKKE-ELSTAT (2015).
of the Athens metropolitan area aged 25–54—but is
significant for the changes in the city’s social geogra-
phy since social change has been driven mainly by the
increase of blue-collar workers. Type 3 neighbourhoods
(Figure 3, Table 3) experienced an increase of blue-collar
workers +18pp whereas the aggregate share of blue col-
lars decreased by −4pp in the entire metropolitan area.
At the same time, managers and professionals was sta-
ble whereas their aggregate share increased by +14pp.
Most type 3 neighbourhoods are located within the cen-
tral municipality and occupy spaces extending around
the bourgeois strongholds of the city centre and cover
a large part of the densely built neighbourhoods that
experienced extensive filtering down since the 1980s.
They are the areas with the highest share of apart-
ment blocks among the high-rise areas—89% of resi-
dents live in apartment blocks compared to the aver-
age of 70% for the whole city—and most of the hous-
ing stock (80%) was built before 1981 against an aver-
age of 50% for the whole city (EKKE-ELSTAT, 2015). These
are the areas of the centre that were increasingly aban-
doned by the middle-class since the late 1970s due to
the declining living conditions brought up by very dense
building and increased air pollution. Former inhabitants
were partly replaced by immigrants who found afford-
able housing in the less attractive housing stock of small
apartments of lower floors in the apartment blocks of
the centre, and particularly in the areas where aban-
donment increased the housing supply. Migrant pres-
ence increased spectacularly (+34pp) and the education
level declined in relative terms, from +7pp above the
average of the metropolitan area in 1991 to +0.5pp in
2011. Housing conditions remained above the average,
reflecting the housing stock that corresponded to more
affluent residents in previous times (Table 3). Type 3
areas are socially contested spaces, where the lower
part of the occupational hierarchy has increased its pres-
ence much more than the upper part between 1991
and 2011. Similar social changes are observed in Madrid
with the formation of ethnic enclaves (Sorando, Uceda,
& Domínguez, 2021).
Finally, type 4 comprises the city’s polarised neigh-
bourhoods where both the shares of managers and pro-
fessionals and blue-collar workers increased between
1991 and 2011. These neighbourhoods are close to the
average both in terms of low/high rise and age of the
building stock. They comprise most of the bourgeois tra-
ditional strongholds in the northern suburbs, along the
coast and the city centre, with by far the highest per-
centage of managers and professionals in 1991 (40%).
This percentage increased by 2011 (59%), but by then
other areas had notably converged (the share of man-
agers and professionals in type 2 areas increased from
28.6% in 1991 to 48.5% in 2011; see Table 3). The share
of blue-collar workers also increased (+3pp) during the
same period, remaining however the lowest among the
types of neighbourhoods presented in Table 3. Type 4
preserved the highest indices for housing conditions and
the education level for its active population. The impor-
tant change between 1991 and 2011 was the increase
of the share of blue-collar workers—unlike all other
types where it decreased—as well as the substantial
increase of immigrants (Table 3) who are almost exclu-
sively female and from countrieswith a reputation of pro-
viding the highest quality of domestic workers (e.g., the
Philippines). Type 4 areas continued to be at the top of
the city’s socio-spatial hierarchy. The change is related
to the large number of immigrant workers who were
employed as domestic live-in personnel in a periodwhen
the abundant supply for this type of work made it much
easier for middle-class households to massively employ
immigrants for domestic work and caretaking, with the
more affluent being able to employ live-in personnel.
5. Conclusion
The research presented in this article showed that
in an ‘ordinary’ metropolis like Athens, socio-spatial
change over two recent decades (1991–2011) in terms of
the trends of professionalisation, proletarianisation and
polarisation can be summarised as follows:
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• The increase, relative stability or mild decrease of
intermediate social categories in most of the tradi-
tionalworking-class areas of the city (type 1)which
moved towards the social middle by losing shares
of blue-collar workers that were much higher than
in all other social types of residential areas at the
beginning of the 1990s and by gaining substantial
shares of managers and professionals as well as
of intermediate occupational positions. The pro-
fessionalisation of these traditional working-class
areas, however, should not be related to the cor-
porate elite and/or to an invasion of gentrifiers,
but mainly considered as the outcome of the spa-
tial entrapment of endogenous social mobility in
traditionallyworking-class neighbourhoods. These
areas account for almost half of the city’s active
population aged 25–54 in 2011.
• The professionalisation of a slightly smaller part
of the city (25%), where the share of managers
and professionals was already above the aver-
age in 1991 and eventually approached that of
neighbourhoods at the top of the occupational
hierarchy by 2011 (type 2). Contrary to working-
class neighbourhoods, these areas around the tra-
ditional bourgeois strongholds, especially outside
the city centre, became less sociallymixed through
a process of embourgeoisement.
• The proletarianisation of a large part of the cen-
tralmunicipality, comprising approximately 10%of
the whole city’s population (type 3). The change in
the occupational composition is due to the long-
lasting abandonment of these neighbourhoods
by native Greek middle-class households follow-
ing the deteriorating living conditions produced
by dense building which put these areas in a
course of perpetual decline. Poormigrants, usually
employed as unskilledworkers, partly replaced the
exiting middle-class population.
• The polarisation which increased social mix in the
traditional bourgeois strongholds following the
increase of the shares of the two occupational
poles. At a closer look, however, an increased mix
is due, on the one hand, to the inflowof poor immi-
grants working for the personal service of upper-
middle-class households and, on the other, to the
significant increase of the share of managers and
professionals (type 4).
In a nutshell, the working-class part of the city moved
towards the middle, but this big move is changing the
content of the social middle both in social and spatial
terms and brings it closer to the bottom. Respectively,
the middle-class part of the city moved towards the
top, but the professionalisation process refers mainly
to positions that are at the bottom of higher occupa-
tions or at the top of intermediate ones. As a result,
this professionalisation process raises new questions
about the limits between upper and intermediate occu-
pational categories as well as between upper and inter-
mediate residential areas. Bourgeois strongholds remain
at the top, but other spaces are converging in terms
of social composition and also implicate these areas in
the aforementioned question of limits. Moreover, their
space is socially diversified by proletarian newcomers
who, nevertheless, occupy specific positions at the ser-
vice of the dominant group. Finally, the centre is reshuf-
fled, but not gentrified. A process of proletarianisation
through filtering-down is the main trend in many of
the city centre neighbourhoods during the examined
period (1991–2011).
The modest development of gentrification in Athens,
at least until 2011, seems to be a paradox. Developments
in other cities of the region, from Istanbul to Lisbon,
point otherwise.Moreover, therewere important factors
favouring gentrification in Athens, like the huge invest-
ment in the city centre related to the 2004 Olympic
games. The argument aboutmodest gentrification is sup-
ported by the type of change in the social profile of neigh-
bourhoods mostly affected and discussed in terms of
this process. Evidence from census data does not cor-
roborate the inflow of gentrifiers or the displacement
of former residents. The main barrier to gentrification
has been the typical Athenian apartment block which
provided housing to a broad range of social strata. This
diversity was not threatened by gentrification because
no investment could make the most affordable parts of
these blocks appealing to gentrifiers’ tastes (Maloutas,
2018). Things have considerably changed since the mid-
2010s due to the rapid development of tourism and of
short-term rentals (STR) that made a large part of the
‘ungentrifiable’ stock appealing for the occasional tourist-
gentrifier (Balampanidis, Maloutas, Papanzani, & Pettas,
2019). The impact of these changes, temporarily stopped
by the pandemic, will be recorded in detail by the next
census. For the time being, we hypothesise that gentri-
fication has been developing more than in the past, as
witnessed by the sharp rise of rents in the city centre
between 2016 and 2018 and the proliferation of Airbnb
andother similar platform listings in the low-status neigh-
bourhoods of the centre. The outcome, however, is still
uncertain since it depends onmany different factors, like
tourist development, policies to regulate STR, the par-
ticipation of foreign investors, the resistance of actual
tenants, etc.
The social polarisation debate helped us to synthet-
ically formulate the investigation of trends for social
change in terms of a broad social hierarchy that can
be used across advanced capitalist societies. The advan-
tage is that this framework can be used comparatively,
although it is imperative to consider the changing con-
tent of the different concepts used across contexts.
Polarisation was ambiguously useful. If taken stricto
sensu, only a rather small part of the city would be eli-
gible where both poles increased (type 4). This would
have limited our attention to around 6%of themetropoli-
tan area, in terms of population share, without a valid
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justification of such a focus. Moreover, polarisation in
Athens is not similar to that of global cities at the top of
the list since the rise of the upper pole, for example, is
not driven by the corporate elite.
It was useful, on the contrary, to consider polari-
sation in the broad sense of spaces losing or gaining
intermediate occupations. Eventually, we believe that
polarisation-related research concerning social change
in today’s metropolitan areas are much more produc-
tive if polarisation, professionalisation and proletariani-
sation are not considered as mutually exclusive, but as
potentially combining elements (e.g., professionalisation
within a polarised context).
This particularised broad matrix of polarisation in
Athens was eventually useful to depict the spatial
imprint of different social/occupational change trends
in the city’s residential space. It could be insightful to
apply the matrix we used to refine the analysis of the
polarisation debate on other cities and distinguish pro-
cesses driven by proletarianisation and professionalisa-
tion. Some broad trends identified in other cities, like
the centralisation of higher occupations and the periph-
eralisation of poverty, were not at all present here.
Gentrification, for example, was very weak, at least up
to 2011. Identifying the main trends and processes of
social change and locating differences among diverse
types of residential areas facilitates to elaborate on
the causal relations behind these trends and processes,
enabling informed comparisons of processes of change
in different cities and not simply of outcomes, making
it possible to assess the significance of contextual diver-
sity. Eventually, social change in the neighbourhoods
of Athens displays differences not only in terms of pat-
terns but also in terms of the content of categories (e.g.,
the characteristics of managers and professionals) and
processes (e.g., professionalisation) used in the analysis.
Our analysis raises questions concerning the differences
observed. These differences may be partly attributed to
disparities between top tier global cities and middle tier
in terms of social structure, and in particular regarding
the content of the upper social pole. On the other hand,
differences and particularities of urban social changes
are due to factors beyond our analysis. Global forces
may be exercising pressure towards some outcomes, but
eventual outcomes are always subject to a lot of other
parameters, like welfare regimes, urban policies, urbani-
sation paths, form of and property rights in the housing
stock, immigration trends and regimes, etc.
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